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Structures of Violence 
in Darfur 
Jan Pronk’s relationship with Sudan 
stems from the early 1970s and the 
1990s when he was Minister for De-
velopment Cooperation in the Nether-
lands.3 Appointed by Kofi Anan in June 
2004 as Special Representative to the 
United Nations, he led the UN Peace-
keeping mission (UNMIS) in Sudan. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
signed on 8 January 2005 put an end 
to almost half a century of civil war in 
Southern Sudan. UNMIS was also given 
the task of providing political and lo-
gistical support to the African Union in 
Darfur. The Sudanese Liberation Move-
ment, together with the Justice and Equality Movement, started a war 
early in 2003, accusing the government of socio-economic and politi-
cal marginalization of Darfur. The conflict has been portrayed as one 
between “Black African farmers” and the Janjawiid, or Muslim “Arab” no-
mads. The latter are considered to be the perpetrators of the so-called 
ethnic violence, carried out with the support of the Sudanese govern-
ment. The Darfur Peace Agreement reached on 5 May 2006, however, 
was only signed by the Sudanese government and part of a rebel fac-
tion of the Sudanese Liberation Movement.4
Jan Pronk was scheduled to step down from his post as under-Sec-
retary General on 1 January 2007, when Kofi Anan would end his term. 
However, on 22 October, the Sudanese government requested Pronk to 
leave the Sudan within 72 hours as it was of the opinion that, by com-
menting in his weblog on clashes between the Government troops and 
rebel factions in Darfur, he had “interfered unwarrantedly ‘in matters 
that do not fall within [his] mandate’ and ‘acted in a way incompatible 
with the impartial and interna-
tional nature of [his] duties or 
inconsistent with the spirit of 
[his] assignment’.”5 As the situa-
tion in Darfur has not changed 
much since the interview took 
place, the views expressed by 
Pronk in the interview remain 
relevant.
Asked for an analysis of the 
current problems in Islam-
ist Sudan Pronk6 highlighted 
some similarities between the 
conflicts in South Sudan and 
in Darfur. Both civil wars were 
referred to in the media as “re-
ligious” conflicts between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims. Pronk, 
however, denounced the idea 
that religion is a major factor in 
the conflicts, stressing instead 
the multi-dimensional nature 
of both conflicts, arguing that 
they were rooted in environ-
mental, economic, and demo-
graphic developments. In both 
cases nomadic peoples were forced to 
settle and engage in agriculture, there-
by clashing with farming communities 
over access to land and water. These 
conflicts were rooted in colonial iden-
tity politics, which had the effect of es-
sentializing tribal categories. In Darfur, 
for example, the colonial government 
granted sedentary peoples “dars,” or 
homelands, while Arab nomads were 
not allotted any land-rights or positions 
of power. Moreover, the state borders 
were colonial constructions that cut 
right through nomadic peoples’ lands. 
Pronk pointed out that the history of 
slavery in Sudan was at the core of the racist attitude of “Arab” peoples 
towards “African” communities. In short, the nature of the conflicts is 
highly complex, with religion playing only a minor role in it.
Q: Why is it then, that religion has been prominent in media analyses of 
the conflict?
P: This is the result of a complete misconception of the reality on the 
ground. Darfur is an Islamic region with a strong Arabic orientation. 
Everyone speaks Arabic; even the African groups speak Arabic as 
their second language. (...) The conflict is of an autochthonous-al-
lochthonous nature. Nomadic tribes are not considered to belong 
in Darfur, even though they have been there for over 200 years. (...) 
I consider the religious component to be of little relevance to the 
conflict, and subordinate to the tribal, economic, and political as-
pects. 
Q: So in fact tribal issues have been part of divide-and-rule politics in the 
history of Sudan?
P: The history of Sudanese politics since [independence in] 1956, and 
even before that date, has been characterized by divide-and-rule 
politics. (...) The attempts by the government at destabilizing the 
South were part of these same efforts, which capitalize on tribal 
differences, and that were repeated also in Darfur. Even the peace-
agreement signed in Abuja is a continuation of this politics. It is an 
agreement, which has been signed by only one faction and the least 
powerful one at that. So yes, divide-and-rule. (...) Now there are as 
many as twelve different rebel factions! I have warned against a So-
malization of the situation with different warlords operating inde-
pendently.
Q: Warlords seem to dominate internal conflicts in African countries apart 
from Sudan, like Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Can one compare 
these situations?
P: Not really. The last three countries are examples of failing states. 
Sudan, by contrast, is a strong state where the central government 
is able to control everything. But even in a strong state total depri-
vation and neglect can lead to resistance. When the centre does not 
react with adequate policies, resistance may lead to a spiral of vio-
lence that gets out of control. If the resistance movement is not so 
strong and politically rather shallow like in Darfur, where the intel-
lectuals are not in charge, violence can become a goal in itself. There 
is hardly any ideology among the leaders: some are simply against 
Khartoum, which is an anti-ideology (...); others just aim at gaining 
control over their own area. The resistance movement is as disinter-
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On 25 September 2006, Jan Pronk delivered 
a keynote lecture at the conference “Culture 
is a Basic Need: Responding to Cultural 
Emergencies,” organized by the Prince Claus 
Fund. In his speech, he passionately argued 
that cultural heritage refers not just to cultural 
property but also to traditions, values, and 
practices that make a community.1 Pronk 
explicitly referred to the annihilation of villages 
in Darfur when illustrating that destructing 
cultural heritage also means the destruction 
of a way of life. Pronk’s concern for community 
structures and for Darfur was discussed in more 
detail during an interview earlier that day.2
I S I M  R E V I E W  1 9  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 7  5 9
Society & the State
ested in its own people—who are living in camps as victims—as the 
government is. 
Q: These movements comprise mainly young men: is there any involve-
ment of women or women’s groups?
P: I have always been amazed, and still am, by the lack of self-organi-
zation and self-protection in the camps. Also in relation to women 
who venture outside the camps; men do not come along to protect 
them. Fear reigns. Now a much more militant generation is coming 
up, with young men turning against each other, also on a tribal basis 
(…) The tribal conflict is transferred to the camps itself which is a 
disastrous development. (…) Youths have no chance to return and 
some might not even want to. There is no employment, no educa-
tion. In Darfur we are losing a generation at this moment, which is 
disastrous. No one cares: neither the resistance movements recruit-
ing them, nor the government. The 40% of affluent Arabs7 living in 
the towns, moreover, consider members of these tribal groups as 
“Untermensch.”
Q: In several interviews you stated that when peace is signed, the main 
perpetrators of violence should be tried by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague. Is there also a role for local mechanisms of 
justice and reconciliation?
P: Yes, for sure. The ICC is important, but I also believe in strengthen-
ing traditional systems of justice and of authority (…), in Darfur, and 
elsewhere, because of the stability these may provide. They can, 
however, never be the only solution as modernization of the state 
is also a requirement for stability. This process will undermine tribal 
systems from the inside; now they are being undermined from out-
side by the accelerated modernization of the 1990s. Maybe, and this 
requires further study, we in the West have played a negative role by 
focusing too much on modernizing the state, on decentralization, 
good governance via western standards, on democracy, etcetera. 
This narrow focus has undermined mechanisms of stability provid-
ed by tribal systems. Traditional leaders have been pushed aside by 
appointed leaders in a modernized state.
Q: Because tribes “deliver” in terms of security and justice?
P: Of course! We may raise our eyebrows about the way conflicts are 
solved by paying blood money,8 but it does provide a way to contain 
violence. It has proven its worth for ages and is well thought out: 
the burden is shared among the members of a tribal group accord-
ing to their capacity. (…) It prevents acts of revenge because this 
kind of reconciliation not only concerns the family, but the whole 
clan or even tribe. All members need to commit themselves to the 
reconciliation by contributing to the payment. [However], in times 
of war this system does not function well. Now it is the government 
that imposes reconciliation on these groups, [which] makes the out-
come very unstable. We really should leave this kind of reconcilia-
tion up to the tribal systems. 
Q: What do you think of the recent turn to religion and human rights as 
foci for development cooperation?
P: Religion is a very important, but long neglected, aspect of develop-
ment processes. Neglect of the cultural dimension, of which religion 
forms part, leads to imbalances. So, if development cooperation 
policies promote knowledge of and respect for other cultures, a “do-
no-harm- policy,” then it is valuable. But I would warn against mov-
ing beyond that.(...) The cultural dimension determines economic 
development to a large extent. In this respect I am not a Marxist; 
there is, of course, a dynamics between both. You can make so many 
mistakes when working in a different culture. (…) I am a traditional 
multi-culturalist and I am not averse to cultural relativism: I relate 
to my own culture where some of its cultural gains, such as certain 
kinds of freedom, have to be continuously fought for. But beware 
of exporting these ideas: do not enforce them on others as this has 
always a destabilizing influence on other societies. Let it please be 
a bottom-up process. (…) The longer you deal with a certain soci-
ety, the more surprises you will encounter and the more you realise 
how little you know. In order to move forward, you have to consider 
yourself a student, you have to be willing to learn, to understand, 
and to place yourself in the position of the other (…). 
Q: And you can take this perspective even when you negotiate with gov-
ernment officials?
P: Well, sometimes I do understand their viewpoint. My concern is that 
at this moment the international political climate does not allow 
for trying to understand the perspective of others. We have now 
a uni-polar system, with Americans holding 
power to the extent that they do not need to 
take heed of other powers. Europe has insuf-
ficiently resisted this development.
Q: Has that been a reason why you did not want to 
use the notion of “genocide” with respect to Dar-
fur?
P: I have three reasons for this. In the first place, 
at the request of the General Assembly, Kofi 
Anan appointed an International Commission 
of Inquiry in November 2004 that was highly 
competent and unprejudiced, in order to write 
a report with just one goal: to inquire if what 
had happened in Darfur was a genocide. The 
inquiry showed that this was not the case, al-
though what had happened was equally hor-
rific. And as this constituted the official view-
point of the UN, I had to propagate the same 
stance. Secondly, I am very careful with the 
notion of genocide since it is also a judicial 
term, which has been codified in the Geno-
cide Treaty. When one proclaims a genocide 
one has [the obligation] to intervene. The Americans have repeat-
edly referred to the conflict in Darfur as a genocide. But when what 
they now refer to as genocide actually took place, they never raised 
the issue. They even refused to put Darfur on the agenda of the Se-
curity Council in 2003 and the first part of 2004, when it all hap-
pened. After that there were many killings, burnings, and murders, 
but nothing that resembled genocide. I consider it a kind of hypoc-
risy: and hypocrisy is not my style. And thirdly, I refer to the conflict 
rather as ethnic cleansing or tribal cleansing, than as genocide. The 
violent character of the conflict is in both cases quite similar, but not 
everyone is killed because he or she is a Fur [a name of one of the 
tribes]. I was the first to use the notion of genocide with reference to 
Srebrenica, but in that case every male Muslim from Srebrenica was 
killed.
Q: Would you like to have an agreement on a UN Peace keeping force in 
Darfur by way of farewell?
P: No, I am not in favour of that solution because that will lead to war. 
(…) In the Security Council I have always stated that a robust force 
is needed, in the sense of its capability to protect, but not that it 
should be a UN force. I think that in the current political climate in 
Sudan sending in a UN force would be counterproductive: it would 
become part of the problem rather than a solution. [Current presi-
dent of Sudan] Bashir would consider it a form of re-colonization, 
as a neo-colonial intervention. He has stated that he would lead a 
war of jihad against it. Though this is an Islamic 
notion, the regime in Sudan is a secular regime 
and it uses this term in order to cover its back 
against Islamic extremists. I am convinced that 
President Bashir will not shy away from lead-
ing or allowing attacks against a UN force in 
Darfur. This would make the political situation 
even more complex than it is now. The extrem-
ists in Sudan are not only religious fundamen-
talists. There is also a strong political notion: 
being Arab. A third dimension of radical op-
position groups is their antagonism towards 
the West. And finally, there is antagonism to-
wards the regime itself. In the West all these 
movements are considered to be one and the 
same. Westerners are inclined to see all op-
position in the region as inspired by Islam. By 
overemphasizing the religious dimension and 
underestimating political and cultural aspects, 
Western politicians have made Islamic extrem-
ism a more forceful antagonistic movement 
than otherwise would have been the case.
Karin Willemse is Assistant Professor in the Anthropology of 
Africa, Department of History, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Notes
1. For Pronk’s speech, see http://www.
princeclausfund.org/en/what_we_do/cer/
index.shtml.
2. The interview was conducted in Dutch. 
The text has been authorized by Jan Pronk.
3. Pronk was Minister of Development 
Cooperation in the periods 1973–1978, 
1989–1992, and 1994–1998. From 
1980–1986, he was Under-Secretary of the 
UNCTAD.
4. For further details on both conflicts see 
www.janpronk.nl and, for example, Willemse 
in ISIM Review, no. 15 (Spring 2005): 14–15.
5. Quoted from: www.janpronk.nl, weblog no. 
37, November 2006. 
6. In 1978–1980 and 2002–2004 Jan Pronk 
held the Chair of “Theory and Practice of 
International Development” at the Institute 
of Social Studies in The Hague. Currently he 
has returned to this position at the ISS.
7. The term “Arabs” refers here to town-
dwellers of Central Sudanese descent also 
called jellaba, and not to Arab nomads, or 
Bedouin, who are engaged in the armed 
conflict.
This narrow focus 
[on modernizing 
the state] has 
undermined 
mechanisms of 
stability provided 
by tribal systems.
